Four U.S. Air Force mission reports and one range fouler debrief form — released to AARO through USCENTCOM mandatory declassification reviews across multiple batches between October 2025 and March 2026 — collectively document at least eight discrete UAP observations by military aircrews conducting ISR missions in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. The documents were declassified, in most cases, by MG Richard A. Harrison, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff. One report, the DOW UAP D74 Syria November 2023 document, carries a recommendation signature from MG Brandon R. Tegtmeier, who held the same position as of June 2025. Taken together, the documents form the most granular look yet at how aircrews formally log UAP contact during routine intelligence-collection sorties.

None of the observations produced a definitive identification. Several key fields — aircraft callsigns, tail numbers, unit designators, geographic coordinates, and the identities of the organizations that exploited sensor footage — are redacted throughout, and the aircraft type in each case is withheld under 1.4(a) exemptions. What survives declassification is the structured data aircrews entered into formal mission reporting systems, the verbatim observation narratives, and the standardized UAP characterization fields that AARO has required units to complete.

What the documents say

DOW UAP D10 — Middle East, May 6, 2022. An Air Force ISR aircraft operating under Operation Inherent Resolve took off at 0246Z on May 6, 2022, conducting target development for a redacted unit. The mission report, classified SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY and declassified by MG Harrison on October 7, 2025, records that at 1514Z the crew "OBSERVED 1X UAP" in its field of view. The observation gentext states: "FROM 1514Z to 1934Z, [aircraft] OBSERVED 5X UAP FLY ACROSS THE SCREEN. AT 1514Z [aircraft] OBSERVED A UAP WITH THE VISRECCE OF A POSSIBLE [redacted] MISSILE FLY ACROSS THE FOV." The four subsequent contacts were assessed differently: "ALL 4X REMAINING UAP FIT CLOSER TO THE PROFILE OF POSSIBLE BIRDS." The weather section notes that "DUST HINDERED MOST FMV COLLECTION OF THE GROUND," a factor that may have limited sensor fidelity for all five observations. Full Motion Video was exploited by an organization identified in the document as DGS1, though what analysis DGS1 produced is not included in the released material. The unit originating the report and the aircraft identity are both redacted. What the document does not provide is any technical analysis of the missile-like first contact, any sensor return data, or any AARO follow-up assessment.

" in its field of view. The observation gentext states: "

DOW UAP D33 — Greece, October 2023. An aircraft assigned to the 33rd Special Operations Squadron (33 SOS), part of the 27th Special Operations Wing (27 SOW), departed Larissa Air Base (LGLR) at 2339Z on October 26, 2023, transiting to Amman, Jordan (OJMS). The mission report was originated by 33 SOS and approved for release to AARO on January 26, 2026, under USCENTCOM MDR 26-0019. At 0035Z, the crew "OBSERVED 1X POSS UAP." The structured UAP data fields record the physical state as solid, propulsion means as unknown, maneuverability observations as "Sharp 90 degree turns," response to observer actions as none, and observer assessment as benign. The report notes no interrogation of the UAP was conducted with sensors, no effects on persons or equipment, and no material recovered. UAP signatures are listed as none; RF frequency and duration are listed as unknown. The FMV was exploited by an organization identified as GET — what that acronym stands for is not explained in the released document, and the analysis produced is not included. The 609 CAOC served as the operations center. Why the propulsion means is listed as unknown while the object was observed making sharp 90-degree turns is not addressed in the document.

DOW UAP D25 — Greece, January 2024. The same 33 SOS unit, again operating with 27 SOW and coordinating through the 609 CAOC, flew a 20-hour, 40-minute ISR mission departing LGLR at 0109Z on January 25, 2024. This document was classified SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY and approved for release to AARO on October 28, 2025, under USCENTCOM MDR 25-0100 through 25-0103. At 0509Z, the crew "OBSERVED AN UNIDENTIFIED AERIAL PHENOMENON (SEE UAP 1)." The structured fields record: the friendly aircraft was at FL250, traveling at 176 knots on trajectory 162 degrees; maneuverability observations were none; UAP response to observer actions was none; no interrogation of the UAP was conducted; the observer assessment was benign; and the physical state was solid. The aircraft type and tail number are redacted under 1.4(a). The document records the UAP contact took place while the crew was not yet on their ISR station — they did not arrive on station until 0635Z — which may explain the absence of sensor interrogation, though the report does not offer that explanation. As with DOW UAP D33, FMV was exploited by GET, and the exploitation findings are not part of the released record.

DOW UAP D74 — Syria, November 9, 2023. This report is the most heavily redacted of the group. Classified SECRET//NOFORN and released to AARO under USCENTCOM MDR 25-0072 on June 2, 2025 — the most recent release date in the batch — it is the one document bearing MG Tegtmeier's signature rather than Harrison's. The aircraft departed at 0217Z on November 9, 2023, conducting multiple ISR collection stints across two geographic targets in Syrian airspace. The report explicitly identifies the supported operation as INHERENT RESOLVE and the operations center as the 609th CAOC. At 2153Z, the crew "OBSERVED AN UNIDENTIFIED AERIAL PHENOMENON AT 37D ST 69 [redacted] 07 [redacted]." The FMV was exploited by a redacted organization. The originating unit, aircraft callsign, tail number, takeoff location, total mission time, and the identity of the exploiting organization are all withheld. The UAP data fields for this document are not reproduced in the released pages, leaving the observer's characterization of the contact — its physical state, maneuverability, and assessment — unknown from the available text. The NOFORN caveat, stricter than the REL TO USA, FVEY handling of the other reports, reflects the sensitivity of the Syrian operational context.

DOW UAP D58 — Range Fouler Debrief, October 2020. This document is structurally different from the mission reports. It is a completed Range Fouler Debrief Form, dated October 27, 2020, and approved for release to AARO under USCENTCOM MDR 26-0038 through 26-0046 on March 27, 2026. The reporting pilot, an O-3, was directed by "KINGPIN" — apparently a controlling authority — to identify an unknown contact. The narrative, written in the pilot's own words, states: "OBTAINED RADAR LOCK AND TARGET POD VIDEO BUT UNABLE TO GET CLOSER THAN 16.9NM TO GET A BETTER ID. THE TARGET POD SHOWED 2 IR SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS. ONE RANGE FOULER WAS CIRCLING AROUND THE OTHER IN 1/30TH OF A SECOND, THEY WERE GONE. TALLY ACHIEVED WAS 2X RED BLINKING STROBES AND NOISE JAMMING WAS RECIEVED. NOISE JAMMING WAS INDICATED BY TWO CHEVRONS."

The form's structured fields record the contact altitude as approximately 22,000 feet, the aircraft as metallic, balloon-shaped, and reflective, with moving parts and an "other" shape designation also checked. The contact was moving, on a heading of approximately 060 to 090 degrees at 15–20 knots. The pilot achieved a visual tally — two red blinking strobes — but could not close beyond 16.9 nautical miles. The form does not record what prevented closer approach. The radar contacts disappeared in what the pilot characterizes as 1/30th of a second. The source of the noise jamming — indicated by two chevrons on the sensor display — is not identified in the debrief. The document was declassified by MG Harrison.

Why it matters and what it leaves open

These documents are significant less for what they assert than for what they formally institutionalize. Each report represents a frontline aircrew completing AARO's standardized UAP reporting apparatus under operational conditions — not a post-hoc reconstruction, but real-time mission data entered into military systems and later routed to AARO through mandatory declassification review. The consistency of the reporting format across units, years, and theaters reflects the degree to which the post-2020 UAP reporting infrastructure has been embedded in routine ISR operations.

The observations themselves span a wide range of the mundane-to-unusual spectrum. Four of the five contacts in the May 2022 Middle East mission were assessed as probable birds; the first, with the visual signature of a missile, was not resolved. The October 2020 range fouler incident — two IR contacts, one circling the other, both vanishing in a thirtieth of a second, with simultaneous noise jamming and visual strobes — is the most technically complex encounter in the batch and the one that most conspicuously resists easy categorization. The Greece reports, by contrast, record stationary or minimally maneuvering contacts assessed as benign by their observers, with no sensor interrogation conducted.

Several questions the documents raise have no answers in the released material. What did DGS1's exploitation of the May 2022 FMV produce? What does GET stand for, and what did its exploitation of the Greece mission footage find? What caused the radar contacts in the October 2020 incident to vanish in 1/30th of a second — and what was the source of the noise jamming? Why was no sensor interrogation conducted during the January 2024 Greece observation? The Syria November 2023 report's UAP characterization fields are not reproduced in the released pages, leaving the nature of that contact entirely undescribed.

No official AARO assessment of any of these specific observations is included in the released material, and AARO has not published a public statement addressing them. The documents confirm that USCENTCOM's reporting pipeline is functioning and that AARO is receiving the products — they do not confirm that any of these observations has been resolved.