Five declassified U.S. Central Command mission reports released to the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office through war.gov document unidentified aerial phenomena encountered by American military aircrews during active combat-theater operations between July 2020 and September 2024. All five were declassified by USCENTCOM Chief of Staff Major General Richard A. Harrison and approved for release to AARO. Together they confirm a pattern: the sightings are officially recorded, the bureaucratic machinery of reporting is intact, and almost everything descriptive about the objects themselves has been redacted or left blank.

What the documents say

The oldest report in the set, DOW UAP D65 Mission Report Persian Gulf July 2020, covers a mission that launched from an undisclosed base on July 16, 2020, supporting NAVCENT in a classified operation whose name remains redacted under exemption (b)(1)1.4a. According to the document, the aircraft observed an unidentified aerial phenomenon at 1830Z at grid 39RVM5, then a second UAP at 1920Z at grid 39RUN — two distinct contacts roughly fifty minutes apart. Weather, the report states, was not a factor in either case. Full motion video was exploited by DGS-1, the document notes, though what DGS-1 found is not included. The classification date was March 16, 2026, making this the most recently declassified document in the batch. The UAP observation fields themselves — descriptions of appearance, behavior, or sensor returns — are not present in the released text.

Full motion video was exploited by DGS-1, the document notes, though what DGS-1 found is not included.

DOW UAP D16 Mission Report Syria July 2022 covers a July 30–31, 2022 armed reconnaissance mission by the 89th Attack Squadron, flying out of Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan in support of Task Force Chosin under Operation Inherent Resolve. The mission ran 20 hours and 57 minutes with 18 hours and 44 minutes on station. According to the report, at 0239Z on July 31, the aircraft observed an unidentified aerial phenomenon at grid coordinate 37SFU271. That is, functionally, the entirety of what the declassified text says about the encounter. The full ISR narrative describes the crew scanning for activity throughout the night — tracking a person on a motorcycle, logging possible technicals, watching a runway — but the UAP section itself is either blank or among the redacted material. Full motion video was exploited by DGS1; what that exploitation produced is not disclosed. MG Harrison declassified the document on October 8, 2025.

The two UAE reports, DOW UAP D23 and DOW UAP D27, both cover October 2023 operations out of Al Dhafra Air Base (ICAO: OMAM).

The D23 report documents a 50th Attack Squadron mission lasting over 20 hours in support of Operation Spartan Shield. The narrative records that at 0241Z the aircraft observed one UAP, and at 0322Z observed a second UAP. Both encounters are logged as UAP Line 1 and UAP Line 2, respectively, but those supplemental lines are not included in the released text — they remain redacted. At 0145Z, before either UAP sighting, Iranian Air Defense issued what the document characterizes as a professional guard call to the aircraft. The aircraft was at flight level 230, heading 031 magnetic, when the call was received. The document lists the aircraft's targeting pod as AN/DAS-1, with AH/GMESH listed under additional avionics. The UAP descriptions themselves do not appear in the released portion. MG Harrison declassified this report on September 12, 2025.

The D27 report, covering a separate October 2023 mission by the 3rd Special Operations Squadron under Operation Enduring Sentinel, is the most detailed of the five regarding UAP behavior — and it still leaves critical fields blank. The aircraft departed OMAM at 2100Z on June 6, 2024 (the report header dates the operation to October 2023, though the takeoff DTG reads June 2024 — a discrepancy in the released documents that remains unexplained). During its return to base, at 0457Z, the aircraft detected one UAP. The document records specific observations: the UAP was flying straight, just over the water, at a speed of 140 knots. The observing aircraft was at 23,999 feet, traveling at 163 knots on a heading of 294. The UAP's physical state is listed as solid. Its propulsion means: unknown. Its response to observer actions: no change. The crew's assessment: benign. The report states explicitly that no interrogation of the UAP was conducted and that no advanced capabilities or materials were observed. Third-party observers are listed as none. The fields for UAP payload and UAP under intelligent control are blank in the released text — either not filled out or redacted. MG Harrison declassified this report on October 24, 2025.

The fifth document, DOW UAP D28 Mission Report, covers a September 20, 2024 armed overwatch mission by SOTU 016, a special operations unit, flying out of OKAS under Operation Inherent Resolve. The mission lasted approximately seven hours. The crew performed a weapons calibration exercise, expending 20 rounds of 105mm, 101 rounds of 30mm, and one AGM-176 guided munition. According to the report, during the precision-guided munition shot, the crew observed an unidentified aerial phenomenon that, in the document's precise wording, flew through the aircraft's sensor field between munition release and munition impact. The UAP event serial number is listed as 202027ZSEP2024-CENTCOM. The object left an IR signature detectable by the aircraft's MX-20 and MX-25 sensors. No third parties reported an additional aircraft in the airspace. The UAP's physical state is listed as solid. The crew assessed it as benign. No advanced capabilities or materials were observed; no effects on persons or equipment were recorded; no objects or materials were recovered. The fields for propulsion means, payload, and whether the object was under intelligent control are blank in the released text. The aircraft was flying straight and level at flight level 130, heading 096, at 170 knots. MG Harrison declassified this report on October 24, 2025.

What these records confirm — and don't

Taken together, these five reports establish several things with reasonable confidence: USCENTCOM aircrews are officially logging UAP encounters during operational missions. The encounters span at least four years across multiple geographic areas of operation. The reporting structure — a standardized MISREP format with dedicated UAP fields — exists and is being used. Full motion video is being collected and exploited by ground stations. AARO is receiving the reports.

What the documents do not establish is anything about what the objects actually were. In every case, the most analytically significant fields — physical description, propulsion, payload, intelligent control assessment — are either blank or redacted. In the D28 case, an object with a detectable infrared signature flew through an active sensor during a live weapons employment, and the released record offers no description beyond the word solid and the crew's benign assessment. In the D16 Syria case, the crew logged a UAP in a grid square over a contested area at 0239Z and the released text moves on without elaboration.

The D23 report introduces one complication worth noting: the Iranian Air Defense guard call at 0145Z, roughly an hour before the first UAP sighting. The document records this as a professional call — standard procedure in the region — and notes no mission impact. Whether the call and the subsequent UAP sightings are related is not addressed anywhere in the released text.

There is also a date discrepancy in the D27 report: the document header describes an October 2023 UAE mission, but the takeoff DTG is listed as June 6, 2024. This may reflect a filing or administrative error, or it may indicate the document was incorrectly labeled before release. The records as published do not explain it.

For researchers tracking AARO's publicly disclosed UAP holdings, these reports confirm the office is receiving operational reporting from active combat theaters, not only legacy or historical case files. What AARO has done with the full motion video, the sensor data, or the blank assessment fields is not answered by any document in this release. Those questions remain formally open.