Five mission incident reports (MISREPs) declassified by Major General Richard A. Harrison, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff, and approved for release to the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) document UAP observations by U.S. Air Force aircrew during long-duration surveillance and combat support missions conducted between July 2020 and September 2024. The reports span multiple operations — Operation Inherent Resolve, Operation Spartan Shield, and Operation Enduring Sentinel — and involve several distinct units. Taken together, they represent the most concentrated set of primary-source UAP encounter records released by USCENTCOM to date in this batch.

What the documents say

The five reports — catalogued as DOW UAP D16 (Syria, July 2022), DOW UAP D23 (United Arab Emirates, October 2023), DOW UAP D27 (United Arab Emirates, June 2024), DOW UAP D28 (East China Sea area, September 2024), and DOW UAP D65 (Persian Gulf, July 2020) — follow a standardized MISREP format. Each contains a narrative timeline, administrative and operational metadata, aircraft equipment loadouts, and, where applicable, a dedicated UAP section with structured data fields.

DOW UAP D16 (Syria, July 2022): Filed by the 89th Attack Squadron (89 ATKS) under TF CHOSIN during Operation Inherent Resolve, this report documents a mission originating from Muwaffaq Salti Air Base (OJMS). The narrative records that at 310239ZJUL22, the aircraft "observed an unidentified aerial phenomenon IVO 37SFU271" — a grid coordinate in Syria. Total mission time was 20 hours 57 minutes, with 18 hours 44 minutes on station. The document states that full motion video (FMV) was exploited by DGS1. The UAP section of this report is substantially redacted, and the specific characteristics of the observed phenomenon are not visible in the released text. The document was declassified on 8 October 2025 under MDR 25-0094 through 25-0099.

"observed an unidentified aerial phenomenon IVO 37SFU271"

DOW UAP D23 (United Arab Emirates, October 2023): Originating from Al Dhafra Air Base (OMAM), this report was filed by the 50th Attack Squadron (50 ATKS) in support of Operation Spartan Shield. The aircraft, operating under NAVCENT coordination, conducted IMINT collection over a period of 17 hours 17 minutes on station. The narrative records two UAP observations: "AT 0241Z, [aircraft] OBSERVED 1X UAP. SEE UAP LINE 1" and "AT 0322Z, [aircraft] OBSERVED 1X UAP. SEE UAP LINE 2." Both UAP lines are redacted in the released version. The document also records that Iranian Air Defense issued a "professional guard call" to the aircraft at 0145Z. Total mission time is listed as 20 hours 43 minutes. FMV was exploited by DGS-2. Declassified 12 September 2025.

DOW UAP D27 (United Arab Emirates, June 2024): Filed by the 3rd Special Operations Squadron (3 SOS) under Operation Enduring Sentinel, this report covers a 10-hour 13-minute ISR mission from Al Dhafra. The narrative states: "AT 0457Z, DURING RTB [aircraft] DETECTED 1X UAP." The structured UAP data section provides the most detailed unredacted characterization in this batch. The reporting aircraft was at 23,999 feet altitude, traveling at 163 knots on a heading of 294 degrees. The UAP is described as traveling "FLYING STRAIGHT JUST OVER THE WATER AT SPEED OF 140 KNOTS." The UAP physical state is listed as "Solid," propulsion means as "UNKNOWN," and observer assessment as "Benign." Interrogation of the UAP: "NO." Response to observer actions: "NO CHANGE." Advanced capabilities or materials: "NO." Declassified 24 October 2025.

DOW UAP D28 (East China Sea area, September 2024): Filed by SOTU 016 under Operation Inherent Resolve, this report describes an armed overwatch mission by an Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) asset operating from OKAS. During a weapons calibration exercise — during which 20x105mm rounds, 101x30mm rounds, and 1xAGM-176 were expended — "crew observed an unidentified aerial phenomena during its PGM shot." The structured UAP section records that the UAP "flew through [aircraft] sensor in between munition release and munition impact." No third-party observers reported an additional aircraft in the airspace. UAP physical state: "Solid." Observer assessment: "Benign." Interrogation: "NO." Notable: "UAP Signatures: IR SIGNATURE DETECTABLE BY MX-20 & MX-25." No advanced capabilities or materials were observed; no effects on persons or equipment were recorded. Operational range listed as "AYN AL ASAD ROZ RAINDROP," placing this mission in the Iraq/Syria theater despite the document's East China Sea label in the release bundle — a discrepancy worth noting. Declassified 24 October 2025.

DOW UAP D65 (Persian Gulf, July 2020): Filed by the 482nd Attack Squadron (482 ATKS) during a named operation redacted under (b)(1)1.4a, this report documents three UAP observations over a 21-hour 17-minute mission operating from OKAS. Observations were logged at 1830Z, 1920Z, and 2345Z on 16 July 2020. Each is noted via FMV, with the aircraft at altitudes between FL180 and FL200 and airspeeds between 90 and 98 KIAS. A guard call was received at 0615Z; the calling ground station callsign is redacted. FMV was exploited by DGS-1. The UAP observation sections for all three sightings are truncated in the released text; no structured UAP characterization data is visible. Declassified 16 March 2026.

Across all five reports, personal identifying information for crew members and points of contact is withheld under FOIA Exemptions (b)(3), (b)(6), and 130b. Aircraft callsigns, tail numbers, and asset types are consistently redacted under (b)(1)1.4a and (b)(1)1.4g. Operation names in D65 and portions of D23 remain classified.

Why it matters

These are primary-source military incident reports, not summaries, assessments, or public affairs releases. They represent routine operational documentation — the same format used to record enemy contact, weather events, or equipment failures — now capturing UAP observations as a standard reporting category. The existence of a dedicated, structured "UAP" section within the MISREP template indicates that UAP reporting had been formalized within USCENTCOM's reporting framework by at least 2022, and likely earlier given the 2020 D65 report.

The D27 report from June 2024 is the most data-rich of the batch in its unredacted form. It provides specific altitude, speed, heading, physical state, and behavioral assessments — the kind of structured data AARO has stated it requires for systematic analysis. The object's reported speed of 140 knots at low altitude over water, its solid physical state, and unknown propulsion are documented assertions by the aircrew. The document does not attempt to explain the object.

The D28 report raises a distinct issue: a UAP that flew through the aircraft's sensor field during an active precision-guided munitions shot — specifically, between munition release and munition impact. The timing is notable because it means the object was in or near a live weapons employment zone. The report records no engagement, no interrogation, and no effects. Whether the proximity was coincidental cannot be determined from this document.

The D65 report from July 2020 — the earliest in this batch — suggests USCENTCOM-area UAP sightings were being formally documented well before 2022, though the structured UAP fields visible in later reports are not clearly present in the truncated D65 release.

How it connects

All five reports bear the declassification authority of MG Richard A. Harrison, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff, and all were approved for release to AARO. This places Harrison as the central administrative figure across the entire batch, and AARO as the designated recipient — consistent with AARO's statutory mandate to collect and analyze UAP reports from military personnel.

The 89th Attack Squadron (D16) and TF CHOSIN connection situates that report squarely within Operation Inherent Resolve, the counter-ISIS mission in Syria and Iraq that has been the backdrop for several other USCENTCOM UAP reports previously noted in this publication's coverage. The 50th Attack Squadron (D23) and 3 SOS (D27) are both based at Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE, which appears in the entity map as the location for the UAP Incident October 2023 and related Operation Spartan Shield activity.

Separately, DGS1 — the Distributed Ground Station unit that exploited FMV in D16 and D65 — appears in the entity connection map as directly linked to the D16 Syria report. DGS-2 is noted for D23. These units process sensor data from remotely piloted and manned aircraft; their involvement confirms that UAP footage, where captured, was reviewed through the standard intelligence exploitation chain.

The Iranian Air Defense guard call documented in D23 is notable context: the aircraft received a "professional guard call" from Iranian Air Defense at 0145Z, approximately 56 minutes before the first UAP observation at 0241Z. The report records no assessed connection between the two events, and none should be inferred from the document alone. However, the sequence is documented in the same mission record.

The context packet flags a tension between two characterizations in this release batch: one report describes UAP physical state as "solid with unknown propulsion means," while external sourcing referenced in the context describes a UAP as "a white, oblong object that appears to be transitioning between air and space without the propulsion changes required by known aircraft." These are distinct reports with distinct observers; the tension cannot be resolved from the documents provided and should not be papered over. The USCENTCOM MISREPs make no claim about objects transitioning between air and space.

Open questions

The most consequential gap across all five reports is the near-total redaction of the UAP-specific data fields in D16, D23, and D65. For D16, readers cannot determine what the aircraft's sensor recorded, what DGS1's exploitation of the FMV concluded, or what characteristics the phenomenon displayed. The open question flagged in the context packet — "What analysis or conclusions did DGS1 reach after exploiting the full motion video?" — is a logical FOIA follow-up target: a request for DGS1 exploitation products associated with MDR 25-0094 through 25-0099 may surface additional material.

For D23, the contents of "UAP LINE 1" and "UAP LINE 2" — referenced in the narrative but entirely redacted — are the documents' most significant missing elements. A targeted FOIA or Mandatory Declassification Review request for those specific attachments is warranted.

For D28, the document's label as an "East China Sea" encounter conflicts with the operational range listed as "AYN AL ASAD ROZ RAINDROP," which is in western Iraq. Whether this reflects a mislabeling in the release bundle, a transcription error, or some other administrative discrepancy is not resolvable from the released text. A follow-up query to USCENTCOM public affairs or AARO would be appropriate.

Across all reports: no document in this batch records a follow-up investigation, a second-look tasking, or any additional analytical product generated in response to the UAP observation. Whether such products exist — and whether they have been separately processed for release — is unknown. AARO's public reporting has indicated it receives these MISREPs as inputs; whether any of these specific cases appear in AARO's case database has not been confirmed.

Finally, the formalization of UAP as a structured MISREP category raises a procedural question not answered by any document in this batch: when was the UAP data field added to the USCENTCOM MISREP template, who directed it, and what reporting thresholds trigger its completion? That administrative history would materially clarify how many similar reports may exist that have not yet been released.